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Strategic Posture and Outsourcing: The case of the US express 
delivery industry 
Volker Mahnke, Mikkel Lucas Overby, Serden Özcan 
Copenhagen Business School 
 
IT-enabled innovations are of increasing importance for competitive success in a range 
to develop 
uential for 
importance 
the crucial 
question: How do capability development strategies differ between first-movers and late 
entrants in IT-enabled services. We develop theory based on three explorative case 
studies – FedEx, UPS and DHL. An analysis of the three companies reveals that 
governance choices are influenced by a company’s attempts to create, imitate, and/or 
leapfrog IT-enabled innovation in varying technological regimes. 
 
 
of industries including express delivery services. How companies choose 
associated competences - in-house and/or through outsourcing - is conseq
creating and sustaining competitive advantage. Against the backdrop of the 
of IT-enabled innovation, the key concern of this chapter is to address 
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Introduction 
 
IT-enabled innovations are of increasing importance for competitive success. By 
new ideas, 
IT-enabled 
to generate 
on do not 
command all necessary competence in-house and internal development is slow and 
costly, ‘distributed capabilities’ need to be coordinated across firm boundaries in 
outsourcing relations (Barney & Lee, 2000; Coombs & Metcalfe, 2000; Quinn, 2000). 
portance of IT-enabled innovation, the key question of 
this overs and 
oices with 
regards to developing capabilities for IT-enabled services are consequential (Argyres & 
Liebeskind, 2000; Barney et al., 2000; Chesbrough & Teece, 1996; Quinn, 2000) 
because they have long term consequences and are hard to reverse, it is far from clear 
how companies choose to develop capabilities for IT-enabled innovation - in-house or 
 ation calls 
er and that 
tion chain. 
innovation, 
outsourcing inevitably produces more conflicts of interest than do centrally managed 
corporations, and those conflicts can hamper the kind of complex, systematic innovation 
that creates valuable business breakthroughs. While the literature stresses the risks as 
innovation we mean “the generation, acceptance, and implementation of 
processes, products or services” (Thompson, 1965: 36). Innovations are 
when they blend hardware and/or software assets with business capabilities 
a novel process, product or service. If adopters of IT-enabled innovati
Against the backdrop of the im
chapter is how do capability development strategies differ between first-m
late entrants in IT-enabled services.  
While the literature agrees on a general level that governance ch
through outsourcing. On the one hand, Quinn (2000) asserts that today innov
for the complex knowledge that only a broad network of specialists can off
companies can profitably outsource almost any element in the innova
Chesbrough and Teece (1996) by contrast argue when it comes to 
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well as the possibilities of sourcing IT capabilities, there seems to be a lack of an 
integrated and systematic analytical approach to the outsourcing decision when it comes 
to the development of capabilities conducive for IT-enabled innovation (Lacity & 
Hirs
e studies – 
 innovative 
rticular, an 
analysis of three companies reveals that governance choices are influenced by a 
company’s attempts to create, imitate, and/or leapfrog IT-enabled innovation in varying 
technological regimes. The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. First, we 
ns on the 
ion. Next, 
text of our 
elivery sector. Third, we comparatively discuss 
propositions and case findings to suggest implications for theory development and 
managerial practice. Conclusions follow. 
 
Capability development for IT enabled innovations: Make and/or buy 
 capability 
vation as a 
ery, 1998). 
First-mover firms that pioneer the commercialization of IT-enabled innovation, such as 
online tracking systems, may be able to acquire a reputation as an industry leader; 
define the product/service category concept (e.g. prototypicality) and shape buyer 
cheim, 1993). 
This chapter develops theory based on three explorative in-depth cas
FedEx, UPS and DHL - on why IT-outsourcing strategies differ between
first-mover and late entrants seeking to adopt IT-enabled innovations. In pa
briefly review the relevant literature to develop integrative propositio
relationship between first and late moving firms and their outsourcing decis
we discuss our methodological approach to theory development and the con
case research --- the express d
 
Several separate literature streams shed light on the question of why
development strategies differ between companies adopting IT-enabled inno
first-mover and late-mover (Freeman & Soete, 1997; Lieberman & Montgom
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preferences for a product/service category; move down the learning curve fast to reduce 
cost; establish technical standards that late entrants are forced to follow; access superior 
consumer information under preferential uncertainty and differentiate offerings to 
r, Lehman, 
der & Tellis, 1993; Kerin, Varadarajan, & Peterson, 
199
 innovation 
leads to buyer switching costs. Such switching costs are incurred for example when a 
novel IT-enabled services requires the structuring of client interfaces, clients have to 
learn the use of particular transaction platforms, and service clients make specific 
 to build in 
s (Katz & 
logies that 
97). First-mover advantages, 
however, are only available if consumer adoption rates do not outpace attempts at 
competence development --- either in-house or through outsourcing. 
While first-movers may enjoy advantages through an early adoption of IT-
enabled innovation, they also face considerable risks and often pay a substantial price 
  innovation 
nnovators’ 
 only after 
movers are 
better positioned to perceive and exploit technological discontinuities that provide 
‘gateways’ for leapfrogging. Late-mover’s leapfrogging attempts are more likely to 
succeed, if various types of ‘incumbent inertia’ inhibit first-movers’ adaptive response. 
segment the customers according to their willingness to pay (Carpente
Nakamoto, & Walchli, 1997; Gol
2; Porter, 1983; Schmalensee, 1982). 
Another first-mover advantage exists if early adoption of IT-enabled
investments in IT systems.  In addition, there are incentives for first-movers
incompatible systems design elements as this increases switching cost
Shapiro, 1985) and to actively prevent the development of interface techno
bridge otherwise incompatible technologies (Greenstein, 19
for pioneering (Boulding & Christen, 2001). A late adoption of IT-enabled
may provide late mover advantages including the ability to free-ride on i
R&D through imitation, and making investments in technology infrastructure
technological and market uncertainty have been resolved. In addition, late-
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For instance, technology sunk cost (Porter, 1980) or inertia in the first-mover’s 
processes delays flexible adoption of capabilities (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988).  
In the following section we develop integrative propositions linking (a) the 
ture on the nature of technological 
advance to outsourcing strategies of first- and late-movers. 
Capability development and the boundaries of the firm 
 
Outsourcing capability development during the adoption of IT-enabled innovation is 
broadly defined as a process undertaken by an organization to contract-out the 
ier who in 
s, & 
n costs and 
firm as a 
contractual governance structure and stresses the transaction risks incurred in vendor 
relations, including unauthorized use of the firm’s technology or know-how and ex-post 
extraction of rents generated through irreversible relationship-specific investments in 
capability development (Chesbrough et al., 1996; Oxley, 2000). In this view, 
in vendor-
59; Teece, 
knowledge 
assets and stresses production cost advantages that stem from specialization in particular 
routines and capabilities that cannot easily be imitated by competitors. Outsourcing of 
capability development conducive for IT-enabled innovation will be considered, if 
literature on firm boundaries and (b) the litera
 
development of IT assets, staff and/or capabilities to a third party suppl
exchange receives monetary return over an agreed period of time (Kern, Willcock
Heck, 2002). Primary theories explaining firm boundaries refer to productio
transaction costs respectively. Transaction cost economics views the 
outsourcing of capability development is constrained by contractual risks 
client relations.  
The knowledge-based view (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Penrose, 19
Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Winter, 1987) pictures the firm as a collection of 
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vendors command comparative advantage in supplying capabilities cheaper and better 
(including the ability to act as transfer mechanisms for industry best practice) compared 
to the outsourcing firm. However, while outsourcing may help firms to access 
t also gives 
 other clients including 
com
s and the 
knowledge based view are complementary in the explanation of firm boundaries (Grant 
& Baden Fuller, 2004; Langlois & Foss, 1999; Madhok, 2002). In sum then, companies 
will tend to rely on external partners in the development of IT-capabilities, to the extent 
that (a) supplier competences are superior; (b) transaction risks are low; and (c) 
:  
P1 e to a greater extent relative to first-movers because they 
face supplier markets that exhibit greater relative competence and higher 
competition between suppliers. 
 
The role of technological advancement
n of why 
 and late-movers, they are far from 
complete as they treat technology advance and its implications - in terms of competition 
and economic organization - as exogenous. The literature on technology advance is 
instrumental in developing more fine-grained propositions.  
capabilities that they cannot build in a reasonable time frame themselves, i
vendors a window to valuable knowledge that they may leak to
petitors (Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, & Winter, 1987; Mansfield, 1985). 
There is increasing agreement that transaction cost economic
utilization of vendors does not pose severe imitation risks.  Thus, we propose
 
:  Late-movers will outsourc
 
 
While current theories addressing firm boundaries give an indicatio
outsourcing strategies differ between first-movers
 
 6
The performance of a technology has a recognized pattern over time, following 
an s-shaped diagram called the S-curve (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978). In tandem with 
a technology’s life cycle is its structural evolution. Most technologies evolve from an 
k. As the 
anizational 
e from its 
 systemic, 
components are tightly integrated and inflexible. Component-system interfaces are 
poorly defined and ill understood and are often in a state of flux. Consequently, IT 
engineers/designers encountering systemic architectures cannot for instance accurately 
nt functionality attributes and do not yet understand how variation in 
one linden, & 
chitectures 
require intense ‘unstructured technical dialogue’ (Monteverde, 1995) and ‘iterative’ 
(Von Hippel, 1994) and ‘overlapping’ (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991) problem solving 
processes within the firm. Accordingly, the firm’s IT development teams need to 
engage in direct observation; frequent face-to-face discussions, interaction with service 
lark, 1992) 
n addition, 
evelopment 
evelopment goals, 
which in turn necessitate close managerial monitoring and involvement (Teece, 1994). 
At the systemic phase, vertical integration rather than the market constitutes the most 
efficient coordinating mechanism (Christensen et al., 2002; Monteverde, 1995).  
initial systemic phase to the opposite modular phase and then cycle bac
technology migrates from one phase to another, the optimal org
configuration of the firm must also shift if it is to continue to capture valu
innovation (Chesbrough & Kusunoki, 2001). When the technology is
measure importa
subsystem impact overall system performance (Christensen, Ver
Westerman, 2002).  
In order for performance improvements to be achieved, systemic ar
prototypes through e.g. computer-based representation (Wheelwright & C
and extensive learning by experimenting (Baldwin & Clark, 1994). I
simultaneous development of various subsystems requires that various d
efforts be closely paced to ensure the simultaneous attainment of d
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Gradually, however, the technology migrates towards modularity –giving way to 
standardization, codification and formalization of accompanying business processes 
(Worren, Moore, & Cardona, 2002). The decomposition of innovation’s architecture 
of vendors 
resence of 
nents from 
le sources 
either in-house or through system integrators (Stremersch, Weiss, Dellaert, & 
Frambach, 2003) even when the externally compatible components themselves carry 
systemic qualities41. Modularity then allows structured technical dialogue within and 
across the boundaries of the firm and thereby efficient vertical disintegration (Robertson 
 
P2: ive to first-movers because 
enabling IT is likely to be modular rather than systemic and structured 
technological dialogue allows for clear interface specification. 
 
Two types of late-movers  
ate-movers 
will differi 
gy leaders. 
Companies with weaker innovative capabilities are often forced to assume a late-mover 
position, and the best they can hope for is competitive parity with first-movers through 
successful imitation or external access of capabilities enabling IT services (Cho, Kim, & 
encourages vertical specialization and leads to the establishment of networks 
with a standard of compatibility (Langlois & Robertson, 1992). The p
specialized component suppliers implies that firms need not source all compo
a single vendor; instead they can mix and match components from multip
& Langlois, 1995). Thus we stipulate: 
   Late-movers will outsource to a greater extent relat
 
While we expect that late-movers outsource more than first-movers, not all l
are alike. Accordingly, attempts at outsourcing capability development 
between two types of late-movers: (a) technology follower, and (b) technolo
 
 8
Rhee, 1998; Hannan & McDowell, 1987; Lieberman et al., 1998). Accordingly, 
technology followers will tend to use external vendors extensively to access valuable 
capabilities if they contribute to fast and inexpensive imitation of a first-mover’s service 
 ‘wait-and-
 1988; Katz et al., 1985). As Freeman and Soete (1997: 273) 
explain some companies may  
… not wish to be the first in the world, but neither do they wish to be left behind 
by the tide of technical change. They may not wish to incur the heavy risks of 
being first to innovate and may imagine that they can profit from the mistakes of 
titors reduces 
inc ven strong 
innovative capabilities, the chances of successful leapfrogging and imitation increase.  
Distinguishing between types of late-movers is not only instrumental to identify 
imitation and leapfrogging threats that the first-mover is likely to encounter; they also 
expose the variation in late entrants’ capability development approaches to the adoption 
a ‘me-too’ 
irst-mover, 
e late do ‘not normally aim to produce a carbon 
copy imitation of’ the IT-enabled innovation introduced by the early entrant (Freeman et 
al., 1997: 276). On the contrary, they will aspire to leapfrog to the extent their 
technological strength allows them to do so.  
offerings. By contrast, firm with strong innovative capabilities may afford a
see’ approach (Dasgupta,
 
early innovators and from their opening up of the market.”  
 
In other words: the opportunity of learning from earlier moving compe
entives to immediate adoption (Chatterjee & Sugita, 1990), and, gi
of IT-enabled innovation. A late moving technology follower will adopt 
strategy with the objective of relying heavily on the technology work of f
whereas technology leaders that mov
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The literature on first-mover advantage posits that an imitative late-mover should 
enjoy decisive cost advantages to be able to match the lead held by theincumbent firms, 
provided that the technological advance remains undisrupted for an extended period 
s lead-time 
mes highly 
(1996) and 
 an imitator 
not an innovator) tends to diminish buyer response to price, quality and promotion, 
leading to the conclusion that imitating late entrants need to cut their prices and spend 
on promotion to a greater extent than the first-mover to achieve the same market share. 
pment and 
flexibility 
positioning 
(including 
transaction and learning costs) IT-enabled services. A competitive vendor market in this 
case will rapidly be able to provide the late-movers with low-cost IT-enabled system 
building and management due to scale, scope and learning economies derived from 
demand bundling and bulk purchase of off-the shelf IT tools and programs.  
wards the 
ompetitive 
unlikely to 
eer through 
innovation as innovation in a product or service can reshape the corresponding 
prototypical category around which consumers form their preferences (Carpenter et al., 
1997; Shankar, Carpenter, & Krishnamurthi, 1998). For a late entrant to leapfrog first-
(Lieberman et al., 1998). Under such conditions, the longer the first-mover’
is, the larger the late-mover disadvantages. Thus, speed to the market beco
critical for the imitating late-mover. For instance, Bowman and Gatignon 
Ghosh et al. (1983) demonstrate that the order of entry (the late entrant being
This means the firm entering later has to emphasize speed of develo
managerial, overhead and process efficiency (through i.e. standardization, 
and compatibility with existing technologies) as well as differentiated 
(Carpenter & Nakamoto, 1989; Christensen, 1997) to offer low-cost 
While imitation of best IT practices helps late-movers move up to
industry’s technology frontier, at best it leads to competitive parity not c
advantage (Barney, 1991) for which a late moving technology leader is 
settle. Empirical evidence shows that late-movers can overtake a pion
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movers, at least the functionality of its IT-enabled service should exceed the value of 
that of first-mover’s (Schilling, 2003). Unless radical innovations are aimed at, 
leapfrogging rests primarily on the architectural innovations. For example, Christensen 
rchitectural 
omponent 
apabilities 
Component 
capabilities concern the mastery of developing new functional components for an IT-
enabled innovation system such as software and hardware. Architectural capabilities 
reconfigure such components with business capabilities in new ways. An architectural 
een components 
but leaves the components and inherent core design concepts unchanged.  The 
ws:  
 
P3:  Late-movers seeking to imitate will outsource comprehensively -both architectural 
and component capabilities- compared to innovative late-movers, which will 
outsource selectively focussing on component capabilities. 
 
and/or-buy 
ations. The 
research design is based on multiple cases in the same industry, allowing a replication 
logic whereby we used each case to test emerging theoretical insights (Yin, 1989). This 
method allows for a close correspondence between theory and data, a process whereby 
(1993) shows that firms entering the disk drive industry based on a
innovation tended to perform much better than firms that entered based on c
innovation. The distinction between component and architectural c
(Henderson & Clark, 1990) is important for the outsourcing decision. 
innovation then significantly changes the relation and interaction betw
implications, for late-movers attempting imitation or leapfrogging are as follo
The express delivery market and IT-enabled innovation 
 
This section illustrates our propositions through an examination of make-
decisions in the context of capability development for IT-enabled innov
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the emergent theory is grounded in the data (Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
This is an appropriate method for our purposes because we are engaged in an 
exploratory theory building exercise rather than theory testing. Cases serve as a context 
‘analytical 
nt of three 
try: FedEx, 
fluences of 
exogenous factors. The objective is to use the case studies as a specific context for 
theory development rather than to describe the company comprehensively. Thus, we 
will be selective, stressing empirical facts that are relevant to our theoretical argument 
apabilities, 
tting is the 
 year 1984 
 pioneered 
the electronic data interchange (EDI)-based shipping and tracking system. The solution 
quickly became the industry norm, maintaining its influence until the mid-1990s. In 
November 1994 with the launch of fedex.com FedEx once again led the industry to new 
territories with the web-based shipping and tracking concept.  
 two basic 
products: overnight air and ground delivery. The former product is the more profitable 
of the two as well as the larger in terms of market size. FedEx, United Parcel Services 
(UPS) and Airborne Express (now acquired by DHL) dominate the domestic parcel 
for theory building, which can be extended to a wider context based on 
generalisation’ (Yin, 1989). We provide an in depth techno-history accou
leading express services firms operating in the US in order of innovative en
UPS, DHL. The choice of cases was determined by the wish to reduce in
on the interrelation between strategic postures and outsourcing of IT c
thereby presenting only a partial picture of the complex companies.  The se
US express delivery services market between 1984 and 2002. We choose the
as a point of departure as it signifies the date FedEx (then Federal Express)
 
Industry background 
 
Express package delivery in the US is a $50 billion industry (2002) offering
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market, which at the same time remains the most important geography for all three 
companies generating over 80 percent of their total revenues. In the air express market 
alone, FedEx, UPS and Airborne Express control approximately 80 percent market 
 are the US 
Priority and Express Mail products, Emery Express and 
the B
S express 
delivery services with 40 perce nt or more of market share since 1979. In fact the 
company is generally credited for turning overnight delivery into a multi-billion dollar 
industry although the USPS pioneered the service with Express Mail in 1970. FedEx 
ervice was 
earned $75 
to the new 
 domestic 
routes. Emery Air Freight, one of the largest domestic air-cargo carriers, jumped into 
the battle in 1978. Its initial objective was to carve out a “heavyweight” niche 
(delivering heavy air cargo the next day) in the overnight services. Airborne Freight 
Corporation followed in 1980 with a new name: Airborne Express. Then in 1982, the 
delivery at 
ther major 
livery firm 
Emery Air 
Freight and Airborne Express, which initially employed leased aircrafts or made use of 
commercial airlines to ship parcels (a practice called freight forwarding); UPS owned a 
large fleet of airplanes and operated out of own hubs. As competition grew and the rapid 
share. The only other large participants competing in the US express market
Postal Service (USPS) with its 
russels-based DHL Worldwide.  
To date, FedEx has maintained its position as market leader in the U
began transporting packages in April 1973. Volume picked up rapidly and s
extended. But the company lost $27 million in its first years; then in 1976 it 
million in revenues. Its success quickly drew traditional cargo carriers in
market. First came DHL in 1977, providing services on only a few selected
biggest of all private package delivery firms, UPS, moved into overnight 
prices that in many cases were half of those charged by FedEx and o
overnight carriers. At the time of entry, UPS was the largest single private de
on most railroads and owned the largest fleet of delivery trucks. Unlike 
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build up of air fleets created overcapacity, the average price of overnight delivery 
declined dramatically (for instance as of 1984, FedEx dropped its rate by 40 percent 
over two years) while the number of service offerings proliferated. The negative impact 
eakness in 
f the years 
mpany reported a 33 percent average increase in year-
on-year revenues between 1982-1984. 
of fast paced-price cutting and discounting was soon augmented by the w
demand. FedEx revenues rose by an average of 49 percent during each o
between 1976 and 1981. The co
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In-house development of EDI-based tracking technologies: First-mover Fe
 
dEx 
In 1984, FedEx broke new ground in the delivery business by introducing the 
PowerShip Plus program. With all the economic downturn and heightened competition, 
the timing of innovation could not have been better. It reflected the founder and the 
Table 1: US Overnight Air Market Shares 
 Airborne FedEx UPS USPS DHL
 
2001 13% 46% 34 0,5%  % 6% 
2000 13% 47% 34 0,4%  % 6% 
1999 13% 47% 34 0,4%  % 6% 
1998 13% 47% 32 0,3%  % 6% 
1994 13% 50% 30  0,2%  % 7%
1993 13% 50% 30  0,2%  % 7%
1992 12% 50% 30  1%   % 8%
1991 11% 51% 30  2%   % 8%
1997 13% 48% 31% 6% 0,2%
1996 13% 49% 32% 6% 0,2%
1995 14% 49% 30% 7% 0,2%
1990 10% 51% 31% 8% 2% 
1988 11% 54% 18% NA 3% 
1986 13% 58% 15% 9% 1% 
      
Source: Healy (2002), Salomon Smith Barney 1998, 1999, 2001, Bear Stearns 15.10.1999 
The Wall Street Journal 05.07.1994, 08.01.1998 
 
 15
CEO Frederick W. Smith’s philosophy: ‘To defend your position, when competitors are 
coming in and narrowing the market, you have constantly to innovate and improve in 
order to maintain a leadership position’ (Smith, 1997). PowerShip Plus consisted of a 
DOS-based 
 customers 
sses, labels 
 and report 
compilation. It was directly linked to the IBM mainframe on which FedEx’s proprietary 
Customer Oriented Service and Management Operating System (COSMOS) ran. 
COSMOS was the company’s centralized management software, which managed 
ven traffic 
rchitecture. 
ectly with 
ers, FedEx 
paid for the system and its installation costs and provided customer training. A 
dedicated phone line was the only requirement from the customers. The innovation 
fuelled FedEx’s growth in the overnight express market. The program was so well 
received that, according to the CIO of FedEx, it quickly became one of the main value-
adde . In 1986, 
d followers 
ception in 
1973, the FedEx founder and CEO insisted that if FedEx were to compete with UPS - a 
company that had already been in existence for over half a century - a myriad of state-
of-the art information systems be built alongside the air and vehicle networks. As early 
PC with two printers located at the customer’s site. The PC’s processor was 
and manufactured by NEC. The program provided over 25 000 most active
with proprietary online services including storing of frequently used addre
printing, online package pick-up requests, package tracking, self-invoicing
delivery vehicles, packages and drivers while tracking weather shifts and e
jams (It had about forty different functions). It was at the heart of FedEx IT a
Every customer service IT system interacted either directly or indir
COSMOS. Because PowerShip Plus was targeted at high-volume custom
d features that FedEx could offer its customers over its competitors
analysts' estimates put FedEx with 58 percent of the overnight market an
UPS and Airborne with 15 and 13 percent respectively.  
FedEx’ technology pioneering was not a coincidence. Since its in
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as 1979, Smith predicted the basis of competition in the next two decades - IT-enabled 
innovation: ‘Information about the package will soon be just as important as the 
delivery of the package … the success of FedEx would be built on a bedrock of mobile 
eference?). 
oon began 
ary system 
ne in about 
1976 but was rewritten (in Cobol) from scratch by FedEx software developers to run on 
IBM’s special ACP operating system. In 1980, the company released a proprietary 
wireless data network called Digitally Assisted Dispatch System (DADS) and became 
tch. DADS 
, 198 local 
The system 
t was used. 
Then came the first version of PowerShip (an Epson system that operated like a postal 
meter) in 1981 and the PowerShip Plus in 1984 (Paul & Pearlson, 1994). Smith saw it 
as a major breakthrough:  
 
and-spoke 
n example 
round and 
t was our 
recognition that, along with time-sensitivity, the ability to track the status of 
every item at every stage on its journey, from sender to recipient, would be 
crucial to customer satisfaction. We understood this even before we had the 
computers, package-tracking systems, and sophisticated databases’ (Smith, r
Under a leadership strongly committed to the technology, the company s
delivering breakthrough innovations. In 1979, FedEx launched the propriet
COSMOS. COSMOS began as a dispatching system on a Burroughs machi
the first cargo carrier to move to mobile data terminals and digital dispa
consisted of a central database (IBM 3081 mainframe); three call centres
dispatch stations, courier vans and the voice and data links between them. 
led to a staggering 30 percent increase in couriers’ productivity the first day i
‘To be able to deliver a new service you have to innovate. The hub-
distribution system which lies at the heart of the FedEx network is a
of that sort of innovation. Another way was the way we integrated g
air systems from the very start…Perhaps even more importan
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technological means to do it. As we have developed the means to do it, so 
information and IT have become central to the FedEx offer, next to our fleet of 
planes and trucks’ (Smith, 1997: 217-218). 
application 
 were built 
n variety of 
accounting systems’ (date, page). In 1983 alone, the firm spent around 5 percent of its 
yearly revenue of $1 billion on IT, primarily on development initiatives. In 1985, FedEx 
employed 600 IT application developers (the entire IT department at rival UPS 
s of PCs by 
PowerShip 
alized that 
urdensome, 
they immediately met with the programmers from IT and came up with an interim 
solution; a lap-top supplied by FedEx-that ran a simple DOS-based software program 
that attached to a forms printer. The program used on-screen prompts to request 
shipping data. Frequent shipping destinations could be stored in a simple linked 
PowerShip 
l access to 
 formation 
l staff. All 
software developers were immediately assigned to major business functions to 
understand internal and external customer needs regarding shipping and tracking. To 
facilitate instant interaction and to improve problem solving, the management built a 
  
All IT-enabled innovations rested fundamentally on strong in-house 
development capabilities and, as the Infosystems magazine observed, many
‘in far less time than large corporations typically take to put together a garde
consisted of 115 people) and was ranked among the top 100 corporate buyer
InfoWorld/Yankee Group, being the only express courier firm in the list. 
was also a product of in-house experimentation. When FedEx sales people re
the paperwork requirements of their largest customers were becoming very b
database. The FedEx management acted quickly on the potential of the first 
version by ordering the development of further built-in functions - above al
FedEx’ IT-driven tracking system. The development project began with the
of cross-functional teams consisting of sales representatives and technica
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development lab, which from time to time hosted end users, as well. ‘It (PowerShip) 
was originally designed to accommodate some very large shippers’ says the head of the 
development team, ‘Once we got a handle on how to manage it, we realized that it 
t out and just recently pretty 
much offered it to anybody that wants to use it’ (date, reference?).   
Outsourced development at the innovative late-mover UPS:   
 
When UPS entered the $2 billion express delivery market in 1982, FedEx and other 
early entrants knew that they were facing a formidable new challenger. As the COO of 
s not a six-
lso voiced 
f their size 
s, UPS had 
little direct effect on business. Now with PowerShip in place, FedEx executives said in 
interviews that their company offered faster pick up, earlier delivery and superior ability 
to trace shipments than UPS.  
Indeed until the late 1980s, UPS had traditionally relied on customers’ 
tomers. As 
 approach, 
-the system 
UPS called 
many of the tracking systems overkill: ’It's not to imply that these are not excellent 
services, but there is a definite cost to them’ (date, ref?). Nelson’s perspective marked a 
notable departure from that of the FedEx CEO Frederick Smith: ‘The ability to track, 
probably had a lot of other applications. So we moved i
 
FedEx put it: ‘UPS will be in the overnight business for a long time. This i
month drill’ (date, reference?). The Vice Chairman of Airborne Express a
concerns: ‘No matter what area they go in they will have an impact because o
and name recognition’ (date, reference?). Yet in the subsequent two year
confidence in their system to avoid providing tracking information to cus
Langowitz (1992: 84) observed ‘To UPS, given their industrial engineering
tracking packages seemed to be an added expense with very little necessity
would deliver’. In a New York Times interview, the CEO, Kent Nelson, of 
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trace and simply manage the large volumes of express items being moved will require 
automation and on-line integration of customer and carrier to an extent only barely 
discernible at present’ (ref?). The CEO of Airborne Express acknowledged why it made 
sense to implement tracking and shipping systems:  
ear (1985). 
ounts. The 
corporate shippers have become astute and are playing one courier against 
another…One approach to combat the growing pressure is to offer “non-pricing” 
enhancements, or offering high volume shippers computer time for printing air 
billing, in addition to package metering and monitoring shipping activity 
ers 
to access its online computer system FOCUS to check shipment status and obtain 
computer-to-computer invoicing service. Despite relatively low cost service offerings, 
UPS’ entry had been far from desirable, as acknowledged by the CEO Kent Nelson: ‘In 
1983, we charged half the price for air delivery that Federal Express did and waited for 
1985 board 
ind FedEx 
he shipping 
en able to 
provide. And that can only been done through technology’ stated the UPS CEO Kent 
Nelson in a later interview (date, ref?). The company had no automatic tracking system 
for its air shipments, a couple of mainframe computers and only 400 PCs. The CIO 
 
Just look at the growth pattern of shipping volume; it grew 45% last y
With that type of growth, a volume shipper can command big disc
throughout the shipping process.  
 
In 1985, Airborne Express followed FedEx in enabling large volume custom
customers to beat down our door. That didn't exactly happen’ (ref?). In late 
members at UPS concluded that that the shipping company was lagging beh
and Airborne in IT. ‘The thing we had to do to grow in air was to convince t
public that we could provide all the services that the leader- FedEx-has be
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Franck Ebrick later recalled ‘It was clear to us that we needed to change to meet 
customer needs to increase productivity in the electronic age. Federal Express had banks 
of old mainframes, which the young company had grown with. But UPS, which took 
e, ref?). ‘If 
in terms of 
launched a 
ith package tracking marking the entry point for 
IT infrastructure, as noted by the CIO Ebrick:  
 
‘There were some applications that were really critical to us, but tracking was 
that. I said, 
We have no network. 
We have no database. We have no repository packaging. We are several years 
 
 
The build-up was immense. In 1983, UPS’ Information Services (IS) Group, 
which was primarily dedicated to accounting, billing and operations reports, totalled 90 
people. In 1985, the same group comprised a mere 118 people and spent $40 million, ‘a 
eek.  UPS 
s and had 
mputer and 
hich linked all of UPS’ computer networks. By 1991, UPS 
was able to boast a network – UPSNet- that linked six mainframes, approximately 250 
mini computers, some 40 000 PCs and an estimated 75 000 handheld units, connecting 
1300 worldwide distribution sites.  
pride in personal service, was not yet plugged into the information age’ (dat
you went into our information services facility in 1985, you went into 1975 
technology’ (date, ref?). Led by the chairman, UPS immediately (when?) 
five-year, $2 billion technology plan, w
always the Holy Grail. People were talking tracking this and tracking 
“Look, we don’t have anything in place to do the tracking. 
away from a sophisticated tracking system”’ (cited in Ross, 2001: 3). 
paltry figure for a corporation with $7.7 billion in revenue’ wrote Business W
started with 400 PCs in 1985, but by 1989, the company had 20 000 PC
installed five IBM mainframes. In 1989, UPS opened up an $80 million co
telecommunications centre, w
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While FedEx developed all its IT software in-house, UPS frequently turned to 
external suppliers to outsource component developments. At the start of the 
restructuring exercise in 1985, UPS hired Andersen Consulting to help reconfigure data 
application 
pplications, 
 provider), 
g software 
developers). In designing the system that coded and tracked packages and automatically 
billed customers for customs duties and taxes, UPS also collaborated with Andersen’s 
Management Information consultants. In addition UPS relied heavily on the consulting, 
years after 
 MaxiShip 
nd software 
orts. Yet, it 
was based on a more modular architecture, which UPS executives viewed as superior to 
the competing offerings of FedEx: ‘A lot of systems impose themselves, but with ours 
you can play around with the perimeter… It has a different ethos behind its design. 
Those [FedEx] systems were created to make life easier for itself rather than its 
have gone 
d got upset 
of demands 
bout 8000 
customers were handled through MaxiShip, which was nonetheless still only one third 
of FedEx’s client base. The technology helped UPS enter the online services and narrow 
down the market/technology gap with FedEx. In 1988, the year before the launch of the 
architecture plans. Subsequently, it teamed up with several external 
development companies, including ConnectSoft (a specialist in Windows a
electronic mail and on-line service), TanData (a logistics software solutions
Geographic Data Technology and MapInfo (digital mapping and trackin
software programming and training skills of Novell Networks. Just five 
FedEx’s release of PowerShip Plus, UPS rolled out a matching system, called
(in 1989). Similar to PowerShip Plus, MaxiShip came with a PC, printers a
that made it easier to create custom shipping manifests and management rep
customers’, noted the logistics systems manager at UPS, ‘many companies 
through the first generation of computers (i.e. PowerShip and Easyship) an
with how inflexible they were. We have had to try and incorporate the sort 
people have now and will have in the future’ (date, ref?). By 1993, a
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UPS tracking system, FedEx controlled 54 percent of the air-express market and UPS 
just 18 percent; the following year, UPS’s market share leaped to 31%. As the CEO of 
UPS, Kent Nelson later admitted, the timing of entry could have been better: ‘We 
e functions 
imitate the 
nologies- a 
and marine 
navigation systems whose vehicle-location technology was used by UPS in deploying 
more than 60 000 trucks, in 1987. Both companies were highly instrumental in the 
development of tracking and shipping technologies.  
 
e new US 
CIO in 1990, his task was to rebuild the package handler’s domestic information 
systems operations: ‘DHL’s US installation consists of a wide range of systems that 
don’t talk to each other… Even more serious is the firm’s lack of a cohesive network 
architecture to link its domestic and international sites and support such strategic 
anier, date, 
in the US 
mid-1980s, 
FedEx dominated the US market whereas DHL emerged as the largest international 
delivery firm controlling over 50 percent of the market. Nevertheless, DHL fell 
significantly behind in the growing US market by all measures, including market share 
probably put too much effort into the infrastructure, instead of holding som
back and addressing more customer projects’. In its quest to “leapfrog not 
competitors” as the UPS’ Kent Nelson put it, UPS acquired Roadnet Tech
transport routing software developer and II Morrow - a maker of aviation 
Imitative late-mover: extensive outsourcing by DHL 
 
When the Brussels-based DHL Worldwide appointed Michael Lanier as th
applications as package tracking, shipment control and customer service’ (L
ref?).  
While FedEx was creating the overnight-package delivery industry 
during the 1970s, DHL was doing the same thing internationally. By the 
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and key applications such as package tracking. Moreover, FedEx and UPS invaded the 
international air express market, leading to a 5 percent drop in DHL’s market share and 
eroding its profitability. One of DHL’s strategic responses was to strengthen its 
ortune 500 
tivities into 
 in Pascal) 
e complete 
control in preparing and tracking shipments, all from their PC (hardware and software 
that performed in a similar fashion as Powership and Maxiship).  
EasyShip quickly ran into operational challenges. At the root of the problem lay 
e from the 
mainframes 
frame and 
llation was 
neither robust nor cost-effective enough to support the highly strategic applications 
planned for launch, in particular those in key areas of customer service and package 
tracking.  
After a brief evaluation of the current technology, the new CIO realized that the 
linked to a 
, ref?). The 
BM RISC 
a database 
repository, but also entered into a co-sourcing agreement with IBM whereby IBM  acted 
as combined system integrator, co-developer and support provider. DHL paid 
approximately $15 million to IBM over two years to complete the migration to the new 
presence in the US as it had already been working with the majority of F
companies overseas. In 1988, the company moved its information systems ac
its US operating unit and in 1989, launched the EasyShip (DOS based written
an integrated shipping processing system that allowed customers to hav
the Unix system that the company had officially adopted upon a mandat
headquarters. It proved very difficult to incorporate the Unix technology (
bought from Pyramid Technology Corp) into the existing systems - main
IBM’s SSP and RPG II on 150 IBM System/36s. Furthermore, the Unix insta
company needed a state-of-the-art package tracking and handling system 
database and put together ‘a revised architectural and technology plan’ (date
plan entailed reengineering around a Unix client/server system based on I
Syster/6000. DHL not only reintroduced an IBM mainframe to serve as 
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system and develop and launch several key applications such as package tracking and 
field systems. In 1994, DHL introduced an agent-based tracking service to communicate 
with US customers. DHL’s system was based on software from Edify Corp and resided 
on IBM OS/2 servers.  
Developing web-based tracking technologies 
Soon after came the Internet. In November 1994 FedEx pioneered the web-based 
tracking concept with the launch of fedex.com. The company used Netscape clients, 
servers and development tools as a platform for building online applications and derived 
ware. The 
r packages 
ctive Web 
n CEO of 
Netscape, says, ‘It was the first outward and visible demonstration of a practical, 
productive use of the Internet by a real business for a real business purpose’. Within ten 
months, approximately 17 000 people were tapping into the company’s Web page daily 
of which 5500 were checking the status of delivery. The site exceeded the one million 
 was soon 
d, ‘Federal 
 and a few 
). The CIO 
Jones added ‘integration of Internet services with our transportation offerings is not an 
addition to our core business; it is our core business’ (date, ref?). FedEx reinforced its 
Web presence with a number of Web-enabled innovations. In February 1995, the 
 
 
much of its online functionality from its PowerShip package tracking soft
website included a tracking feature that customers could use to monitor thei
and is widely considered as one of the business world’s first intera
applications. Jim Barksdale, former CIO and COO of FedEx, and the
hits-per-month milestones at the end of 1995. By some estimates, FedEx
saving up to $4 million a year. At the time, the founder and CEO Smith note
Express is just one enormous electronic neural system with 100 000 people
thousand trucks and planes and facilities appended to it – literally’ (date, ref?
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company launched a limited beta test of FedEx InterNetShip, an application designed to 
allow customers to process a shipment from a Web site. In late summer, a drop-box 
locator, enabling users to locate the closest of FedEx boxes, was added to the Web site. 
the Internet 
age aimed 
have them 
order entry 
and order confirmation, transmitting the order from a buyer’s Web browser to a FedEx 
Web server. The order then went over a secure link to a Windows NT server at the 
merchant site for fulfilment. FedEx expanded the portfolio of services with the online 
also build 
Using such 
 Web sites 
 into them. 
In 1997, FedEx was receiving an average of 26 000 tracking requests a day and spent $1 
billion on IT developments. In April 1998, the company announced the launch of newly 
redesigned fedex.com and the installation of the one-millionth customer electronic 
online shipping connection, which included FedEx PowerShip hardware/software 
day. FedEx 
he updated 
ed an order through fedex.com, the 
information found its way to COSMOS. The customer would then be able to track the 
status of the shipment through PowerShip. When initiating coverage on 22 June 1999, 
Citigroup’s SmithBarney transportation analysts wrote 
 
In October 1996, the company entered (first-mover among shipping firms) 
commerce services business with BusinessLink, a software and services pack
at midsize businesses that want to sell their products on the Web and 
physically delivered by FedEx. BusinessLink included software to handle 
catalogue and hosting system Virtual Order. Individual customers could 
integrated web sites using FedEx Applications Programming Interfaces. 
systems allowed FedEx to encourage the growth of unique, content driven
under merchant brands, which would also have FedEx capabilities integrated
shipping system. In 1999, fedex.com handled 60 million transactions per 
also used the Internet to refine its existing COSMOS system. Under t
module, whenever a FedEx customer plac
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FedEx is determined to be the technology leader in the air express business and 
to embed itself in the Internet. Frankly we are impressed with what it has 
achieved in its technology offerings. From customs clearance to track and trace, 
hnology is 
e. We would note, however, 
that the technological gap with UPS has narrowed (date, ref?). 
Indeed, the advent of Internet opened a new era in UPS’ business, as well. One 
month after rival FedEx got its website up, UPS created its own web page (December 
1994). Although the initial web page was static, UPS quickly developed tools that 
ce systems. 
application 
ons such as 
PS OnLine 
Professional, a windows-based system of package tracking and shipment processing; 
UPS OnLine Host Access, which links customers to a UPS data centre), they acted as 
the server side of an Internet client/server application (customers could set their e-
commerce applications to act as clients to the UPS Online Tools while simultaneously 
 portion of 
 development and expansion of these UPS online family of 
hard ntres with 
ters, 2000 
LANs, and 3000 dedicated lines.  
As in the previous technology cycle, the first-mover and innovative and 
imitative late-movers - FedEx, UPS and DHL, respectively - followed different 
Internet commerce strategies, and yield management, FedEx’s tec
more advanced than anything we have seen elsewher
 
would allow deeper integration into their customer’s businesses and servi
UPS quickly bundled its online services with an innovative set of 
programming interfaces that let companies create their own hooks into functi
package and signature tracking. Called, UPS OnLine Tools (consisting of U
acting as a server to end user’s browsers). In 1996, the company spent a huge
its $1.2 billion IT budget on
ware, software, and services. Its IT infrastructure included two data ce
nine mainframes, 250 minicomputers, 90 000 PCs, 77 000 portable compu
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approaches to IT development associated with internal versus external collaboration. In 
the words of Business Week magazine, ‘[while] FedEx forced customers to adopt its 
proprietary software…and  shunned alliances until recently, UPS jumped into 
ed become 
ns services 
umbleweed 
ahoo. ‘We 
don't believe we are software developers’, said UPS E-commerce chief, Mark Rhoney, 
criticizing the arch-rival FedEx’s in-house development approach: Companies making 
that gamble ‘are trying to go a bridge too far’ (date, ref?). The UPS Vice Chairman and 
Exe
inger, and 
wful lot of 
things better than we did. That really put us in the lead. Our competition wanted 
to do it all themselves, and that really gave us a leg up as we built these things. It 
was a good move for us (cited in Ross, 2001: 4). 
 
Ex (in July 
 initial site 
es and did 
eb-tracking 
service to the site and instead provided the same information through an integrated 
voice response system). Soon after the company decided to change everything, the 
home page, linked pages, navigation and all links to legacy systems and initiated a 
partnerships with giants such as Oracle and IBM’ (date?). UPS had inde
aggressive in establishing multiple relationships with e-commerce applicatio
providers like Open Market, Pandesic, SAP, Lotus, and NetDox Inc. and T
software. UPS also established tie-ins with search engine vendors such as Y
cutive VP Mike Eskew added,  
 
There were people out there, like IBM and Andersen and Harb
hundreds of other folks that we’ve done alliances with, that did an a
DHL joined the Web fray almost eight months after the pioneer Fed
1995) with an IT budget outspent over four-to-one by FedEx and UPS. The
was too static as it was structured as a collection of hard-coded HTML pag
not offer any tracking service (In fact until 1997, DHL did not add any W
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reengineering project with the sole purpose of developing a Web-centric infrastructure. 
Even two years later, in 1997, the magazine Information Week wrote ‘Three biggest 
shippers-FedEx, UPS and DHL let their customers track their packages over the Web. 
. When the 
nt tracking 
rier pickup, 
system had 
a ‘hybrid design’, being partly Windows-based and partly Internet-based. It integrated 
client software with the World Wide Web. IBM helped create DHL Connect, including 
the development of Java program.  
 
f all cyber 
shopping purchases, the US Postal Service (USPS) handled 32 percent and FedEx 
Captured only 10 percent. FedEx was steadily losing market share to UPS even in 
segments where it had a commanding lead. For instance in the overnight service, UPS’s 
volume grew faster than that of the market leader FedEx between 1996 and 2001. 
the shipper 
 but also IT 
ry revenue. 
ht delivery 
were now being sent electronically. In May 2001, Business Week magazine summed up 
‘UPS moved quicker into FedEx’ turf than FedEx moved into that of UPS. And with 
Smith’s early romance with computers gave him critical traction on the Internet, the 
Of the three, DHL’s Web-based service has been the weakest’ (exact date?)
first phase was completed in June 1998, DHL released its online shipme
system that empowered the customers with functions such as requesting cou
shipment tracking, reporting and supply ordering. Called DHL Connect, the 
FedEx moves to outsourced development 
 
In 1998, the once unthinkable happened: UPS delivered about 55 percent o
Besides, the Internet was driving new businesses to the latter. UPS was 
choice for eBay and Amazon.com. Worse, not only the intense competition
itself in particular e-mail and fax was eating into FedEx’ overnight delive
Most of the business documents that had traditionally been sent by overnig
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technology is now undermining the choicest part of FedEx’ operations: Overnight 
delivery, which makes up 50% of its revenues.’ (exact date?) FedEx was the first big 
transport firm to launch a Web site with tracking and tracing capabilities but it failed to 
rick Smith 
change the 
with each other. What I didn't understand was how 
rapi
 These developments increasingly pushed FedEx to choose outsourcing as the 
method of obtaining competences required to produce, enhance and maintain IT-
enabled innovations. In an unusual bid, the company let its internal IT work with SAP 
poration- a 
 Interactive 
velopment 
 wirelessly 
track shipments, determine the status of a shipment and email that information to 
multiple e-mail accounts. W-technologies expanded the tracking capabilities of 
fedex.com to handheld devices. 
 
ee table 2). 
doption of 
IT-enabled innovation at FedEx, UPS, and DHL suggests also three additional themes 
for theory development. The first theme relates to systematic differences in the decision 
situation between first and later movers along three dimensions:  Adoption risks, 
retain first-mover advantage as the FedEx founder and chairman Frede
acknowledged ‘It was very clear to me that this [Internet] was going to 
whole way that people interacted 
dly it would be adopted’ (date, ref?). 
to develop a shipping application, formed an alliance with Interworld Cor
provider of enterprise-class e-commerce software systems and hired Lokion
as content manager of the Web site fedex.com. In 2001, FedEx signed a de
deal with wireless application provider W-Technologies to offer customers to
Discussion  
 
The following discussion confronts our propositions with the case findings (s
While cases support our propositions, the analysis of outsourcing during the a
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supplier competence, and transaction risk. If adoption risks are high - in the sense that 
consumer’s speed of switching from one particular service offering to an IT enabled 
service offering is unknown - first-movers considering outsourcing need to trade-off 
f imitation 
o match or 
ilities does 
tive risks and by implication increases the likelihood of sourcing IT 
competences externally.  
First-movers, who consider outsourcing, need to account for unspecified 
interfaces in the early phase of technology development due to unstructured 
nology has 
nstructured 
ed to late-
 structured 
interfaces allow for more complete contracting with multiple competent suppliers 
(Poppo & Zenger, 1998). By implication, late-movers face lower transaction risks and 
can take full advantage of vendor’s comparative advantage unconstrained by 
complications of unstructured technological dialogue and other transaction risks 
nd learning 
considering 
ained in finding competent and specialized vendors. Late-movers 
face such difficulties to lower degree. In sum then, differences in decision making 
parameters between first and second movers substantiates our assertion that boundary 
choices differ accordingly. 
R&D risk sharing with vendors and the simultaneously increased likelihood o
via vendors. Late-movers do not face such trade-off as their objective is t
leapfrog first-mover advantages. Here external supply of component capab
not increase competi
technological dialogue. Late-movers do not face such difficulties if tech
moved from the integral to the modular phase. Simultaneously, due to u
technological dialogue transaction risks are higher for first-movers compar
movers. By contrast late-movers can control for transaction risks because
(Christensen et al., 2002). In addition, due to limited vendor scale, scope, a
economies in the early phase of market development, first-movers 
outsourcing are constr
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The second theme explores the inter-play between decision makers’ uncertainty 
over the nature of technological advance. Technological volatility increases decision 
makers’ uncertainty over whether technological advance is competence destroying or 
erformance 
l change is 
nhancing). 
mpact are 
coloured by the path dependent history of internal capability development: 
Misperceptions of technological change are the result of myopia leading to competence 
traps (Levinthal & March, 1993).  
ize risk of 
elopments 
 will make 
d demand 
uncertainty has resolved, as the DHL case illustrates. In addition, as the successful 
leapfrogging attempt by UPS shows, being engaged in a wide net of external vendors 
helps avoid competence traps due to exposure to diverse external knowledge sources. 
Late-movers attempting leapfrogging, provided they command innovative capabilities, 
r timing of 
ns and the 
at varying 
degrees of outsourcing have implications for creating and defending first-mover 
advantages. FedEx, the first-movers in both EDI and web-enabled tracking systems -in 
the beginning of a TLC - refrained from extensive outsourcing for three reasons. First, 
enhancing. First-movers considering outsourcing need to trade-off p
disadvantages of being locked into obsolete technology (where technologica
destructive) with differentiation advantages (where technological change is e
As shown in the case of FedEx, perceptions of technological change and its i
Late-movers’ objective seeking to imitate or leapfrog is to minim
being locked in obsolete technology and to recognize new technological dev
early that the first-mover may overlook. For example, imitative late-movers
new partnering arrangements only after technological uncertainty an
are better positioned to recognise technological breakthrough, and can tailo
vendor partnering accordingly. 
The final theme explores the inter-dependence of boundary decisio
creation and defence of first-mover advantages.  Our evidence shows th
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supplier markets remained underdeveloped (Willcocks & Fitzgerald, 1994) and 
technological uncertainty increased the risk of contractual failures (Williamson, 1975). 
In addition, extensive outsourcing would have increased the risk of imitation by 
 confronts 
ter on) IT 
provement 
possibilities level out. Interestingly, first-movers facing technological discontinuity and 
competence destroying competition will encounter performance penalties if integrated 
in obsolete competences (Afuah, 2001), as will first-movers outsourcing too late in the 
e timing of outsourcing 
arra s cognitive 
that moves 
beyond the current discussion in the literature, they also have implications for 
managerial practice. The practical implications of this paper are to move beyond 
simplified recommendation in the literature either stressing risks (Chesbrough et al., 
1996) and possibilities of outsourcing (Quinn, 2000) in the context of adopting 
 
utsourcing 
ate-movers 
bled innovation. Recognizing the role of technological advance 
(competence enhancing vs. competence destroying) and attempted strategic posture 
(first-mover, imitative or leapfrogging late-mover) mediates both risks and available 
benefits in important ways.    
latecomers leading to competitive parity. While the first-mover initially
interdependent interfaces, where ‘unstructured technical dialogue’ occurs, moving along 
a particular TLC, first-movers will tend to in-source (outsource) early on (la
related component processes as the TLC proceeds and marginal im
development of a particular life cycle. By implication, th
ngements and their antecedence as well as the avoidance of first-mover’
biases will constitute a crucial area of future research to actively pursue.  
While the three themes discussed above inform theory development 
innovations respectively (cf. the discussion of transaction cost economics and the
knowledge based view respectively). While classifying risk and benefits of o
remains important not all benefits and risks are equally relevant for first and l
in the adoption of IT ena
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 Propositions FedEx UPS DHL 
 
P1 
competence and 
higher compet
between suppliers
 
services to the 
electronic one. Yet, it 
did so through
leapfrog rather than 
. To 
 acquired 
velopment 
firms. By the end of 
the US vendor 
a
 chose to 
on vendor 
expertise, as 
mpany did not 
e necessary IT 
 in the US. At 
e, it ran 
into significant 
ure 
s that it was 
 to solve 
internally. DHL did 
not face any imitation 
risks.  
Late-movers 
outsource to a gre
extent relative 
first-movers beca
they face sup
markets that exh
greater rela
will 
ater 
to 
use 
plier 
ibit 
tive 
ition 
. 
FedEx was th
entrant into 
overnight 
services market.
also the first co
to offer IT-e
tracking and s
customers. By 
out free hardwa
software and pr
customer edu
FedEx converte
market into 
e first 
the 
package 
 It was 
mpany 
nabled 
hipping 
handing 
re and 
oviding 
cation, 
d the 
an 
 strong 
UPS lacke
infrastructure 
competences to
build and impl
tracking system
immediately tu
market. Yet it 
imitate FedEx,
had to develo
competencies 
process of outs
that end, the firm
two software de
1980s, 
in-house IT capabilities. market w
developed and
gained acceptan
d the 
and 
 internally 
ement the 
 and hence 
rned to the 
wanted to 
 and thus 
p in-house 
in the 
ourcing
DHL also
rely 
market 
the co
have th
muscle
the same tim
infrastruct
problem
unable
s well 
 EDI had 
ce. 
Late-movers 
outsource to a gre
first-m
enabling 
modular rather 
systemic beca
structured
will 
ater 
if 
is 
than 
use 
The project sta
“skunkworks” bu
realized, 
management 
cross-functional 
teams as it nee
define 
functionalities and 
specif
Late-m
to im
both architectural
component 
capabil
compare
rted as 
t once 
FedEx 
formed 
internal 
ded to 
new 
The enabling IT
modular than 
built its trac
shipping applic
chose multiple
approaches with a 
of
ey for 
ovation 
standards.    
Leapfrogging t
was the ob
functionality w
as FedEx had
sizeable installe
its three-year 
and acquired a
for creating 
 was more 
four years 
king and 
ation. UP
 DHL to
from m
decision
he pioneer 
jective of 
as the key 
 built a 
d based in 
head start 
 reputation 
he express 
DHL 
imitate 
the in
reason 
serving
routes fo
large 
DHL hired 
P2 
extent relative to 
overs 
IT 
 
technological 
dialogue allows for 
clear interface 
ication. 
its potential was 
improve performance. 
Unstructured technical 
dialogue was k
the inn
enhancement 
previously when FedEx 
S 
 contracting 
number 
 technology vendors, 
which provided various 
components of the system. 
It followed open 
o benefited 
odularity and 
in fact one of the first 
s was to 
overhaul the closed 
and inflexible 
infrastructure in 
favour of a more 
modular  
P3 overs seeking 
itate will 
outsource 
comprehensively -
 and 
ities- 
d to 
innovative late-
movers, which will 
outsource selectively 
focussing on 
component 
capabilities. 
 
management which meant 
that innovation along 
t
package delivery. UPS 
chose selective 
outsourcing of 
components while 
retaining the architectural 
development of the system 
in-house. 
sought to 
rather than 
expand the 
technology frontier in 
dustry. One 
was that it was 
 on a few 
r some 2500 
customers. 
IBM as a 
system integrator and 
system developer.  In 
a two year contract, 
IBM renewed the 
infrastructure and 
developed major 
applications. 
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Conclusion 
 
This paper has argued that IT-enabled innovations are of increasing importance for 
ices. How 
or through 
ntage. The 
 capability 
development strategies differ between first-movers and late entrants in IT-enabled 
services? We developed theory based on three explorative case studies – FedEx, UPS 
and DHL, and the analysis of three companies revealed that governance choices are 
T-enabled 
hnological 
ic posture attempted influence transaction costs and 
possibilities of tapping into comparative advantages of outsourcing vendors in the 
adoption of IT enabled innovations. 
competitive success in a range of industries including express delivery serv
companies choose to develop associated competences - in-house and/
outsourcing - is consequential for creating and sustaining competitive adva
key concern of this paper was to address the crucial question: how do
influenced by a company’s attempts to innovate, imitate, and/or leapfrog I
innovation in varying technological regimes. Importantly, the nature of tec
advance as well as strateg
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i Central to this variation is the firm’s “strategic orientation”, which bears a significant impa
timing decision (Snow & Ottensmeyer, 1990; Schoenecker & Cooper, 1998). As strategic o
function of not merely capabilities and resource profil
ct on its entry 
rientation is a 
es but also organizational attributes, firm history 
and management attitudes, later entry does not necessarily always imply comparatively weak innovative 
capabilities and a lack of critical resources on the part of entrant.  
 
